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Abstract The article addresses the potential impact of
functional brain imaging (functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging and positron-emission tomography) on
surrogate end-of-life decision-making in light of vary-
ing state-law definitions of consciousness, some of
which define awareness behaviorally and others func-
tionally. The article concludes that, in light of admo-
nitions by neuroscientists that functional brain imaging
cannot yet replace behavioral evaluation to determine
the existence of consciousness, state legislatures, courts
and drafters of written advance healthcare directives
should consider treating behavior, not function, as the
touchstone for end-of-life decision-making.
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Introduction
What if there had been a neurological test that would
have shown whether Terri Schiavo was truly in a
permanent vegetative state?
Maybe there was.
Statutes throughout the United States authorize
surrogates to make end-of-life decisions – such as
withholding or withdrawing artificial nutrition and
hydration – on behalf of persons who have been
diagnosed as being in a permanent vegetative state.
Traditionally, this diagnosis is clinical, based on an
assessment of behavior. Advances in brain-imaging
technology, however, now enable neuroscientists to
detect signs of cognitive brain function even where
behavioral evidence of consciousness is absent.
This article addresses the potential impact of
functional brain imaging on surrogate end-of-life
decision-making in light of varying state-law defini-
tions of consciousness, some of which define aware-
ness behaviorally and others functionally. The article
concludes that, in light of admonitions by neuro-
scientists that functional brain imaging cannot yet
replace behavioral evaluation to determine the exis-
tence of consciousness, state legislatures, courts and
drafters of written advance healthcare directives
should consider treating behavior, not function, as
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Bioethics and the Law of Surrogate End-of-Life
Decision-Making
Mainstream bioethicists treat personal autonomy – the
right of control over one’s body and one’s medical
care – as a central value underlying the traditions of
Western medical practice.1 Personal autonomy is also
firmly rooted in American law. As early as 1891, in
Union Pacific Railway v. Botsford, the United States
Supreme Court enunciated “the right of every
individual to possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority
of law.”2 This includes a right not to have medical
care, including artificial nutrition and hydration. In
the landmark 1990 case of Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Public Health, the Supreme
Court said the right of “bodily integrity” is constitu-
tionally guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and includes the right to
refuse medical treatment.3
All states now have legislation addressing personal
autonomy and the right to refuse treatment. Many
statutes expressly authorize written advance directives
for medical care; some include optional form advance
directives that will satisfy the requirements of state
law.4
When a patient is not competent, a surrogate must
make healthcare decisions on the patient’s behalf.
Bioethicists have formulated three models for surro-
gate exercise of autonomy rights, with the goal of
deciding how the patient would choose if he or she
were able:
& Advance directive—If there is an advance direc-
tive giving instructions for future medical care,
the surrogate follows the patient’s instructions.
& Substituted judgment—If there is no advance
directive or there is one but its instructions do
not seem to cover the situation presented, and the
patient previously had otherwise made known his
or her preferences and values (for example,
through conversations with friends and family
members), the surrogate makes a decision based
on the patient’s subjective wishes, attempting to
decide as the patient would have decided when
competent.
& Best interests—If nothing is known about the
patient’s preferences and values, the surrogate
makes a decision based on an objective assess-
ment of the patient’s best interests, attempting to
decide as most people would choose under the
circumstances.5
State laws generally track these three bioethical
models. Legislation in Florida – the venue of the
Schiavo case – is exemplary: If a patient has an
advance directive giving instructions for medical care,
the surrogate must follow the advance directive.
Absent an advance directive, the surrogate must make
the health care decision that the surrogate “reasonably
believes the patient would have made under the
circumstances.”6 If there is no indication what the
patient would have chosen, the surrogate “may
consider the patient’s best interest in deciding that
proposed treatments are to be withheld or that treat-
ments currently in effect are to be withdrawn.”7
The extent of a surrogate’s decision-making au-
thority to withhold or withdraw artificial nutrition and
hydration may depend, however, on the condition that
has caused the patient’s incompetence. Some states
statutorily restrict such authority to patients whose
incompetence is caused by coma or permanent
vegetative state.8 And even in states where there is
no such statutory restriction, the patient’s advance
directive might effectively impose the same restriction
by specifically addressing only coma and permanent
vegetative state, as do some form advance directives.
That is why Terri Schiavo’s parents renounced her
diagnosis of vegetative state. Florida’s statutory
authorization for removing feeding tubes mentions
only “terminal condition,” “end-stage condition,” and
“persistent vegetative state.”9 The statute does not
mention another disorder of consciousness—the
1 See Hastings Center, Guidelines on the Termination of Life-
Sustaining Treatment and the Care of the Dying 6–8 (1987)
2 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
3 497 U.S. 261, 278–279 (1990)
4 See generally Alan Meisel & Kathy L. Cerminara, The Right
To Die §§ 8.01–10 (3d ed. 2007)
5 Hastings Center, supra note 1, at 27–28.
6 Fla. Stat. § 765.401(2) (2007).
7 Id.
8 See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1337.13(B)(1) (West 2007).
9 Fla. Stat. § 765.302(1) (2007). It is an open question,
however, whether Florida’s state constitution guarantees rights
in end-of-life decision-making that are broader than those
statutorily prescribed.
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“minimally conscious state.” If Terri Schiavo had
been diagnosed as being minimally conscious rather
than vegetative, the outcome of the case might have
been different.
Thus, in some cases, a diagnosis of minimally
conscious instead of permanently vegetative can mean
the difference between sustaining life rather than
ending it. The distinction between the two – and an
accurate diagnosis – becomes pivotal.
The Permanent Vegetative State
and the Minimally Conscious State
The diagnosis of “permanent vegetative state” was
formalized in 1994 by the Multi-Society Task Force
on PVS, which described the vegetative state as “a
clinical condition of complete unawareness of the self
and environment.”10 Unlike comatose patients, who
have no spontaneous eye-opening and cannot be
awakened, patients in a vegetative state have sleep–
wake cycles and will open their eyes when awake.11
They are, nevertheless, unconscious. Patients in a
vegetative state “show no evidence of sustained,
reproducible, purposeful, or voluntary behavioral
responses to visual, auditory, tactile, or noxious
stimuli; show no evidence of language comprehen-
sion or expression; have bowel and bladder inconti-
nence; and have variably preserved cranial-nerve and
spinal reflexes.”12 Recovery from a vegetative state is
unlikely after 1 year if traumatic in origin and
6 months if non-traumatic in origin.13 The condition
is accurately called “persistent” at the outset and then
“permanent” after passage of the time when recovery
becomes unlikely.14 Nevertheless, in many statutes,
judicial decisions and other sources, the phrase
“persistent vegetative state” is commonly used to
describe what is actually a permanent vegetative state.
The diagnosis of “minimally conscious state” was
formalized in 2002 by the Aspen Neurobehavioral
Conference Workgroup, which described minimal
consciousness as “a condition of severely altered
consciousness in which minimal but definite behav-
ioral evidence of self or environmental awareness is
demonstrated.”15 Patients in a minimally conscious
state demonstrate one or more of four types of
behaviors on a reproducible or sustained basis:
following simple commands; gestural or verbal yes/
no responses; intelligible verbalization; and purpose-
ful (as opposed to reflexive) behavior. Purposeful
behavior can include, for example, appropriate smil-
ing or crying in response to emotional stimuli;
vocalizing or gesturing in response to the linguistic
content of questions; reaching for objects that
demonstrates a clear relationship between object
location and direction of reach; touching or holding
objects in a manner that accommodates their size and
shapes; and pursuit eye movements or sustained
vision fixation in response to visual stimuli.16 Like
vegetative patients, minimally conscious patients have
severe immobility, are unable to perform activities of
daily living, are unable to communicate meaningfully,
have bladder and bowel incontinence, and require
artificial nutrition and hydration.17 Meaningful recov-
ery is unlikely after 1 year.18
The key difference between permanently vegeta-
tive and minimally conscious states is in awareness.
The vegetative patient is completely unaware. The
minimally conscious patient has some degree of
awareness.
The minimally conscious state is sometimes mis-
diagnosed as permanent vegetative state.19 The
diagnosis of both disorders can be difficult, for it is
wholly clinical, requiring repeated examinations in a
search for behavioral signs of awareness.20 There is
no neurological test to distinguish between the two.
Or is there?
10 See Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of






15 J.T. Giacino et al., The minimally conscious state, 50
Neurology 349, 350–51 (2002).
16 Id. at 351.
17 Ronald E. Cranford, What is a minimally conscious state?,
176 West. J. Med. 129, 130 (March 2002).
18 J.T. Giancino et al., supra note 15, at 352.
19 Id. at 350.
20 See Steven Laureys, Eyes Open, Brain Shut, Sci. Am. 34
(May 2007).
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Functional Brain Imaging
Brains scans produced by magnetic resonance imag-
ing (MRI) and x-ray computed tomography (CT)
provide structural images of brain anatomy, which
can reveal brain damage but cannot detect signs of
awareness. In contrast, brain scans produced by newer
technology – functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) and positron-emission tomography (PET) –
can indirectly indicate brain function.
Functional brain imaging targets neural brain
activity, which leads to increased consumption of
oxygen and glucose and a resulting increase in the
flow of freshly-oxygenated blood to the most active
regions of the brain. An fMRI scan detects such
activity by measuring the surplus of oxygenated blood
that is delivered to those regions. Oxygenated and
deoxygenated hemoglobin in red blood cells have
different magnetic properties, on which the fMRI
relies to measure changes in the ratio of oxygenated
and deoxygenated blood.21
A PET scan, in contrast, detects neural brain
activity by measuring glucose consumption in differ-
ent parts of the brain, enabling identification of the
network of brain regions that is most active during
performance of a given mental task. Radioactive
isotopes attached to glucose molecules are injected
into the patient, and the PET scan uses particle
emissions from the isotopes to measure glucose
consumption. (Relative to fMRI, PET imaging is
more invasive and is not as widely available.)22
Functional brain imaging indicates brain activation
during one condition relative to another – such as
visual stimuli versus no visual stimuli – by measuring
neural activity in the brain regions that make sense of
such stimuli.23 For example, activity in brain regions
involved in speech comprehension might be detected
upon reading aloud in the patient’s native language
versus an unknown language. Similarly, activity in
brain regions involved in face recognition might be
detected upon showing the patient pictures of family
members versus strangers. Statistically significant
neural activity as between the two conditions – called
“neural correlates of consciousness”24 – shows up as
blobs of color on fMRI and PET images.
In a few instances, fMRI and PET scans have
demonstrated neural correlates of consciousness in
patients with no behavioral signs of awareness. For
example, in a 2005 study of a 23-year-old woman
who had sustained severe traumatic brain injury and
showed signs of a vegetative state, fMRI imaging
detected significant neural activity in motor-response
regions of the woman’s brain when she was asked to
imagine playing tennis.25
This technology suggests an alternative to the
traditional behavioral approach to ascertaining the
presence or absence of awareness. If behaviorally-
demonstrated signs of awareness are overt, fMRI and
PET scans can be said to reveal signs of awareness
that are covert, demonstrated functionally rather than
behaviorally.
Can covert signs of awareness produced by fMRI
or PET technology – a blob of color on a brain scan –
demonstrate that a patient is minimally conscious
rather than permanently vegetative? If, when the
patient’s name is spoken, a PET or fMRI scan shows
significant activity in the regions of the brain that
process auditory language, does that mean the patient
is in some way aware?
Neuroscientists working at the cutting edge of this
technology warn against drawing such conclusions,
for there are differing theories as to what patterns of
neural activity constitute evidence of consciousness.
One theory, for example, is that not all neural activity
evoked by a stimulus is indicative of consciousness;
activity in some brain regions may be associated with
conscious perception but in other brain regions it may
21 See, e.g., S.A. Bunge & I. Kahn, Cognition, Neuroimaging –
An Overview, in The Encyclopedia of Neuroscience (Adelman
& Smith, eds., 4th ed. in press); Joy Hirsch, Functional
neuroimaging during altered states of consciousness: how and
what do we measure?, in The Boundaries of Consciousness:
Neurobiology and Neuropathology 25, 29 (Steven Laureys ed.,
2005).
22 See, e.g., S.A. Bunge & I. Kahn, supra note 21; Susan A.
Greenfield & Toby F.T. Collins, A neuroscientific approach to
consciousness, in The Boundaries of Consciousness, Neurobi-
ology and Neuropathology 11, 12 (Steven Laureys ed., 2005).
23 See, e.g., id.
24 See Axel Cleeremans, Computational correlates of con-
sciousness, in The Boundaries of Consciousness, Neurobiology
and Neuropathology 81, 82 (Steven Laureys ed., 2005).
25 See, e.g., Adrian M. Owen, et al., Detecting Awareness in the
Vegetative State, 313 Sci. 1402 (Sept. 8, 2006).
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merely reflect non-conscious processing.26 Admon-
ishments like these are common:
& “Functional neuroimaging cannot (and should not)
replace bedside clinical evaluation as the criterion
for assessment patients with disorders of con-
sciousness.”27
& “[R]esults from these studies should be interpreted
cautiously for as long as we do not fully
understand the neuronal basis of consciousness.”28
& “An appropriate neural response…, although
suggestive, is not unequivocal evidence that a
person is consciously aware.”29
& “This is not ready for prime time.”30
The law, in any case, does not account for these
advances in neuroscience.
Legal Definitions of Unawareness: Behavioral vs.
Functional
Most state statutes governing surrogate end-of-life
decision-making predate the 2002 formalization of the
diagnosis of minimal consciousness and address only
coma and the permanent vegetative state, providing
legal definitions of unawareness within the context of
the terms “permanent unconsciousness” or “persistent
vegetative state.” Some of these statutes define
unawareness behaviorally, others functionally.
Here are some examples of statutory language that
defines unawareness behaviorally:
& Florida: “absence of voluntary action or cogni-
tive behavior of any kind” and “inability to
communicate or interact purposefully with the
environment.”31
& Alabama: “cognitive thought, sensation, purpose-
ful action, social interaction, and awareness of self
and environment are absent.”32
& Delaware: “total and irreversible loss of con-
sciousness and capacity for interaction with the
environment.”33
& Connecticut: “the individual is at no time aware of
himself or herself or the environment and shows
no behavioral response to the environment.”34
& Maryland: “a patient has suffered a loss of
consciousness, exhibiting no behavioral evidence
of self-awareness or awareness of surroundings in
a learned manner other than reflex activity of
muscles and nerves for low level conditioned
response.”35
Here are some examples of statutory language
that defines unawareness functionally:
& Idaho: “no higher cortical function and no
awareness of self or environment.”36
& Maine: “the patient totally lacks higher cortical
and cognitive function, but maintains vegetative
brain stem processes.”37
& Ohio: “unawareness of one’s being and environ-
ment” and “total loss of cerebral cortical func-
tioning.”38
& West Virginia: “the person has intact brain stem
function but no higher cortical function and has
neither self-awareness or awareness of the sur-
roundings in a learned manner.”39
26 See Stanislas Dehaene, et al., Conscious, preconscious, and
subliminal processing: a testable taxonomy, 10 TRENDS in
Cognitive Sciences 204 (May 2006).
27 Joseph T. Giacino, et al., Functional Neuroimaging Appli-
cations for Assessment and Rehabilitation Planning in Patients
With Disorders of Consciousness, 87 Arch. Phys. Med. Rehab.
S69 (Dec. 2006).
28 Steven Laureys, Death, unconsciousness and the brain, 6
Nature Reviews 905 (Nov. 2005).
29 Adrian M. Owen, et al., supra note 25.
30 Kelli Smith, Looking for hidden signs of consciousness, 446
Nature 355 (Mar. 22, 2007) (quoting Nicholas Schiff).
31 Fla. Stat. § 765.101(12) (2007).
32 Ala. Code § 22–8A-3(10) (2007).
33 Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 2501(r)(1) (2007).
34 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 19a-570(10) (2007).
35 Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen § 5–601(o)(1) (West 2007).
Other state statutes that define unawareness behaviorally
include: Ga. Code Ann. § 31–32–2(13) (2007); 755 Ill. Comp.
Stat. § 40/10 (2007); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20–403(6) (2007); N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 26:2H-55 (2007); 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5422
(2007); S.D. Codified Laws § 34–12D-1(7) (2007); Va. Code
Ann. § 54.1–2982 (2007).
36 Idaho Code Ann. § 39–4502(10) (2007).
37 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 18-A § 5–801(s) (West 2007).
38 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 1337.11(V), 2133.01(U) (West
2007).
39 W. Va. Code § 16–30–3(s) (2007). Other state statutes that
define unawareness functionally include: S.C. Code Ann. § 44–
77–20(7) (2007); Utah Code Ann. § 75–2–1103(8).
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At least two states define unawareness both
behaviorally and functionally—for example, the
Kentucky definition is “an absence of cerebral cortical
functions indicative of consciousness or behavioral
interaction with the environment.”40 A few others,
such as Oregon, define unconsciousness with neither
a behavioral nor a functional bent, simply using
language like “awareness of self and external envi-
ronment.”41 And many state statutory schemes do not
define awareness at all—for example in California,42
Iowa,43 New Mexico44 and Hawaii.45
Case law, too, vacillates between behavioral and
functional definitions of awareness. For example, in
the seminal 1976 right-to-die case Matter of Quinlan,
the New Jersey Supreme Court quoted an expert
witness’s functional definition of a vegetative patient
as “‘a subject who remains with the capacity to
maintain the vegetative parts of neurological function
who…no longer has any cognitive function.” 46 Yet in
1987, in Matter of Jobes, the same court used a
behavioral definition as “no behavioral awareness of
the surroundings in a learned manner.”47
In short, many existing statutory and judicial
definitions of the vegetative state do not account
for the diagnosis of minimal consciousness, the
advent of functional brain-imaging technology that
may theoretically provide evidence of conscious-
ness, or both.
Potential Impact on Surrogate End-of-Life
Decision-Making
Statutory Restrictions
The potential impact of functional brain imaging on
surrogate end-of-life decision-making is perhaps
greatest in states where legislation restricts surrogate
refusal of artificial nutrition and hydration to con-
ditions like terminal illness and permanent vegetative
state. In those states, the impact may depend on
whether state law defines awareness behaviorally or
functionally.
For example, in Ohio, the withholding or with-
drawing of artificial nutrition or hydration by a
surrogate named in a patient’s advance directive is
statutorily restricted to situations where the patient is
in a “terminal condition” or “permanently uncon-
scious state.” 48 Because Ohio law defines awareness
functionally, 49 the refusal of feeding tubes might well
be treated as statutorily prohibited – regardless of
what the patient might have said in an advance
directive – if an fMRI or PET scan detects neural
correlates of consciousness.
The situation is different in Florida, where the
statutory authorization for surrogate refusal of artifi-
cial nutrition and hydration includes “persistent
vegetative state” but does not mention other disorders
of consciousness such as the minimally conscious
state. Because Florida’s statutory definition of aware-
ness is behavioral,50 the detection of neural correlates
of consciousness through fMRI or PET imaging
should not preclude a diagnosis of permanent vege-
tative state within the meaning of Florida law. Thus in
Florida, unlike Ohio, functional brain imaging should
not affect the outcome of a future case like Schiavo.
Even if fMRI or PET technology had revealed neural
correlates of consciousness in Terri Schiavo, that in
itself should not have cast doubt on her diagnosis,
given Florida’s behavioral definition of the vegetative
state.
Florida’s statutory authorization for surrogate
refusal of feeding tubes also includes “end-stage
40 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 311.621(12) (West 2007); see also
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 154.01(5m) (2007) (“complete and irrevers-
ible loss of all of the functions of the cerebral cortex . . . and a
complete lack of behavioral responses that indicate cognitive
functioning”).
41 Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.505(18) (2007); see also Ark. Code Ann.
§ 20–17–201(6) (2007); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 137-J:2(XVII)
(2007).
42 Cal. Prob. Code §§ 4605–4643 (West 2007).
43 Iowa Code § 144A.2 (2007).
44 N.M. Stat. § 24–7A-1 (2007).
45 Haw. Rev. Stat. § 327E-2 (2007). Other state statutes that do
not define awareness include: Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 36–3202
(2007); Minn. Stat. § 145C.01 (2007); N.Y. Public Health Law
§ 2965 (McKinney 2007); N.D. Cent. Code § 23–06.5–2
(2007); Tenn. Code Ann. § 32–11–103 (2007); Wash. Rev.
Code § 70.122.020 (2007).
46 70 N.J. 10, 24, 355 A.2d 647, 654.
47 108 N.J. 394, 403, 529 A.2d 434, 438.
48 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 1337.13(E), 2133.08(A)(1)(a),
2133.09(c)(2) (West 2007).
49 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
50 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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condition” in addition to “terminal condition” and
“persistent vegetative state.”51 The statute defines
end-stage condition as “an irreversible condition that
is caused by injury, disease, or illness which has
resulted in progressively severe and permanent
deterioration.”52 Similar provisions appear in some
other state statutory schemes.53 It is possible that
minimal consciousness might in some instances be
viewed in those states as constituting an end-stage
condition and thus being within an authorization for
refusal of feeding tubes regardless of whether func-
tional brain imaging is treated as precluding a
diagnosis of permanent vegetative state.
Advance Directives
Functional brain imaging could also affect the scope
and efficacy of advance directives in many states—
again, depending on whether state law defines
awareness behaviorally or functionally. Most people
who execute advance directives use prepared forms,
and many of those forms – particularly the optional
forms set forth in many state statutory schemes – are
couched in language of vegetativeness or uncon-
sciousness, which implicates definitions of awareness.
For example, West Virginia’s statutory form ad-
vance directive applies, by its express wording, only
when a physician certifies that the patient has “a
terminal condition” or is “in a persistent vegetative
state.”54 Because West Virginia law defines awareness
functionally,55 a West Virginia court might well
conclude that an instruction in the language of the
form advance directive – e.g., for refusal of feeding
tubes if the patient is “in a persistent vegetative state” –
does not apply where fMRI or PET imaging detects
neural correlates of consciousness. Thus, any West
Virginian who wishes not to be kept alive in a state of
minimal consciousness that is suggested solely by
functional brain imaging would be well advised to say
so in special instructions added to the statutory form,
which West Virginia law permits.56
There is a further consideration in states like Maine
– another state that defines awareness functionally57 –
where the statutory form advance directive addresses
not just terminal illness and “unconscious” but also
situations where “the likely risks and burdens of
treatment would outweigh the expected benefits,”58 a
formulation that appears in many form advance
directives.59 Maine’s functional definition of aware-
ness might mean that a Maine court would treat the
detection of neural correlates of consciousness as
precluding a diagnosis of “unconscious” within the
meaning of the statutory form, but it is still possible
the surrogate could refuse artificial nutrition and
hydration on the ground its risks and burdens would
outweigh its expected benefits.
Some forms are structured so that there are
separate statements of preference for different con-
ditions. For example, Oregon’s statutory form calls
for separate instructions for “close to death,” “perma-
nently unconscious,” “advanced progressive illness,”
and “extraordinary suffering.”60 Maryland’s statutory
form calls for separate instructions for “terminal
condition,” “persistent vegetative state,” and “end-
stage condition.”61 In states like Oregon and Mary-
land that define awareness behaviorally, functional
brain imaging that detects neural correlates of
consciousness should not affect the determination
whether a patient is “permanently unconscious” or in
a “persistent vegetative state” for purposes of invok-
ing an instruction for that condition. The result could
be different, however, in states that defines awareness
functionally. In those states, again, anyone who
wishes not to be kept alive in a state of minimal
consciousness that is suggested solely by functional
brain imaging should say so in special instructions.
51 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
52 Fla. Stat. § 765.101(4) (2007).
53 See, e.g, Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen §§ 5.601(i), 5.603;
Okla. Stat. tit. 63, §§ 3101.3-.4; Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.635(1).
54 W. Va. Code § 16–30–4(g) (2007).
55 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
57 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
58 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 18-A § 5–804(6)(a) (West 2007).
59 See, e.g., Cal. Prob. Code § 4701 (West 2007); N.M. Stat.
§24–7A-4 (2007).
60 Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.531 (2007).
61 Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen § 5–603 (West 2007).
56 See W. Va. Code § 16–30–4(g) (2007) (“The living will may,
but need not, be in the following form and may include other
specific directions not inconsistent with other provisions of this
article.”).
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What should such special instructions say? How
“special” should one get? The lawyers among us
might be tempted to draft something like this:
I hereby authorize my surrogate to withhold or
withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration if I am
in a permanent vegetative state as diagnosed by a
clinical evaluation of behavior, even if there is
significant activation of my brain’s calcarine
cortex, extrastriate cortex or fusiform gyrus in
response to visual stimuli, or similar activation
of my network loci in response to auditory or
noxious stimuli.
We should resist the temptation. The more specific
an advance directive gets in prescribing conditions
under which one would not want to be kept alive, the
greater the danger that a condition not identified with
such specificity will be treated as outside the scope of
the directive. It ought to be sufficient – and is likely
safer – to say something simple like this:
I hereby authorize my surrogate to withhold or
withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration if I am
in a condition that renders me permanently
unable to interact behaviorally with people and
my environment.
In any case, unless and until neuroscientists can
reach consensus on whether and which patterns of
neural activity detected by fMRI and PET scans
constitute evidence of consciousness, people drafting
and executing advance directives should consider
speaking behaviorally rather than functionally. Lan-
guage that invites functional definitions of awareness
risks complications created by new imaging technol-
ogies and new discoveries about the brain that might
lead to unforeseen notions of consciousness.
Standards of Proof
A unique question is presented in California because
of that state’s unusual approach to legal standards of
proof in cases involving surrogate end-of-life deci-
sion-making. Nationally, the dominant standard of
proof in such cases is the heightened civil standard of
“clear and convincing evidence” rather than the usual
civil standard of “preponderance of the evidence.”62
In California, however, the applicable standard of
proof can turn on whether the patient is persistently
vegetative or minimally consciousness: For minimally
conscious patients who made no advance directive
and have a court-appointed conservator, the standard
for determining the patient’s end-of-life wishes (such
as whether to have artificial nutrition and hydration)
is clear and convincing evidence, but in all other cases
the standard for determining end-of-life wishes is
preponderance of the evidence.63
Consequently, the applicable standard of proof in
California might turn on the results of functional brain
imaging in some cases involving minimally conscious
patients, depending on how the California courts
choose to define awareness – behaviorally or func-
tionally – which is currently an open question,
because California is one of those states where there
is no statutory definition of awareness.64
Absence of Legal Definitions
Absent a statutory or case-law definition of aware-
ness, how is a state court to determine the impact of
fMRI or PET technology on the determination
whether a patient is in a permanent vegetative state?
State courts confronting this issue will find an
answer in the 1994 definition of the vegetative state
by the Multi-Society Task Force on PVS and in the
2002 definition of the minimally conscious state by
the Aspen Neurobehavioral Conference Workgroup.
Those definitions are behavioral. Vegetative patients
“show no evidence of sustained, reproducible,
purposeful, or voluntary behavioral responses to
visual, auditory, tactile, or noxious stimuli.”65 Min-
imally conscious patients demonstrate “minimal but
definite behavioral evidence of self or environmental
awareness.66
Thus, from a neuroscientific perspective, covert
signs of awareness that are produced by functional
brain imaging should have no impact on medical
diagnoses of permanent vegetative state or minimally
conscious state, which currently depend solely on
62 See Alan Meisel & Kathy L. Cerminara, supra note 4, at 3–
126.
63 Conservatorship of Wendland, 28 P.3d 151 (Cal. 2001).
64 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
65 Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, supra note 10 (emphasis
added).
66 J.T. Giancino et al., supra note 15 (emphasis added).
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overt signs of awareness that are revealed behavior-
ally. The courts should heed the neuroscientists’
admonitions that fMRI and PET scans cannot yet
replace clinical evaluation of behavior as the standard
for distinguishing between the permanent vegetative
and minimally conscious states67—that this technol-
ogy “is not ready for prime time.”68
Substituted Judgment Decision-making
And what of the patient who has no advance directive
but spoke to friends and family members about end-
of-life wishes in strictly lay terms? The Schiavo case
sparked a national dialogue on end-of-life choices.
Untold numbers of Americans must have made oral
statements in March of 2005 like this: “I would never
want to be kept alive on machines or tubes like a
vegetable.” For them, absent an advance directive, the
law would apply the substituted judgment model for
surrogate exercise of autonomy rights, looking to the
person’s known preferences and values as revealed by
such statements.69
When people say in conversation that they would
not want to be kept alive “like a vegetable,” what do
they mean? Would the average American conclude
that one is not a “vegetable,” despite the absence of
any behavioral signs of awareness, if fMRI or PET
imaging detects increased neural consumption of
oxygen or glucose in response to auditory or visual
stimuli?
Not likely. When people voice fears of being kept
alive “like a vegetable,” they are usually thinking in
terms of behavioral awareness, not blobs of color on a
brain scan. Not many among us would want to be
kept alive if they were permanently incapable of
interacting with the people and things around them,
regardless of whether fMRI or PET technology
reveals neural correlates of consciousness. Yet there
are certainly some who would want neural correlates
of consciousness to be taken into account in any
decision whether to withdraw life support, and their
concerns, if voiced, should be addressed.
If fMRI and PET technology is not ready for
prime time in the neurological realm of diagnosing
the permanent vegetative and minimally conscious
states, it likewise is not ready for prime time in the
minds of ordinary Americans who voice preferen-
ces not to be kept alive “like a vegetable.” For
substituted-judgment decision-making, such expres-
sions of end-of-life wishes should be assessed
primarily from a behavioral perspective and should
not turn on the results of functional brain imaging
absent knowledge that the person would prefer a
functional assessment.
Conclusion
According to the neuroscientists, there is not a
neurological test that would have shown whether Terri
Schiavo was truly in a permanent vegetative state—at
least not yet. Covert signs of awareness produced by
fMRI and PET technology can provide tantalizing
suggestions of consciousness, but functional brain
imaging cannot yet replace behavioral evaluation as
the touchstone for end-of-life decision-making.
Courts should know this; state legislatures should
know this; and drafters of written advance directives
for healthcare should know this. Courts that are called
upon to adjudicate disputes about life-sustaining
treatment should understand the behavioral–function-
al dichotomy in statutory and case-law definitions of
awareness, seek appropriate guidance from any
applicable state-law definitions, and turn to the
neuroscientific definitions of the permanent vegeta-
tive and minimally conscious states where state law is
silent. Legislatures in states that define awareness
functionally instead of behaviorally should reconsider
those definitions in light of the neuroscientists’
admonitions about the limits of functional brain
imaging. And drafters of written advance directives –
form-writers as well as individuals – should
consider using language for surrogate end-of-life
decision-making that speaks behaviorally rather than
functionally.
67 See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
68 See supra note 30.
69 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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